Tyonex (Nig.) Ltd. & Anor. v. Pfizer Limited
Court: Court of Appeal (Lagos Division)
Suit No: CA/L/25/08
Judgement delivered on Thursday June 24, 2010
Citation: 51 NIPJD (CA. 2010) L/25/2008
Jurisdiction: Nigeria
BEFORE:
M.B. DONGBAN-MENSEM JCA (Presided and Read the Lead Judgment)
PAUL ADAMU GALINJE JCA
IBRAHIM M. MUSA SAULAWA JCA
Appearances: John Duru – for the Appellants; Ogunkeye (with him, Nzo Emerole (Miss) – for the Respondent.
Subject Matter: Appeal from the Federal High Court in a Patent Infringement Action — Evidence — Cross-Examination — Evaluation of Evidence — Direct Oral Evidence — Fair Hearing — Validity of Judgments Arising from Flawed Procedure
Issue:
Whether the decision of the trial court denying appellants their right to cross-examine respondent’s witness (called PW4), who did not appear in court, and permitting the said witness to file an affidavit evidence without more, is not a breach of appellants’ right to fair hearing.
Facts:
The plaintiff instituted an action in the High Court of Lagos State seeking declaratory and injunctive reliefs that; the disputed patent No. RP 9970 is valid and has been infringed by the defendants and all those on whose behalf the defendants are sued, injunction restraining the defendants and others on whose behalf the defendants are sued from dealing with the product branded as AMOLVAS or any other product containing Amlodipine Besylate or otherwise infringe the patent in question, order for delivery up for destruction on oath of all stock of AMOLVAS tablets or any other product which infringe the patent in question and an enquiry as to damages.
The defendants counterclaimed for general damages arising from acts of plaintiff’s agent which resulted in the sealing of 1st defendant’s premises and/or depriving it his income from trade in AMOLVAS, declaration that the detention of the 1st defendant’s chief executive/managing director amounts to violation of his fundamental rights, exemplary and aggravated damages. An affidavit deposed to by one of plaintiff’s witnesses who was not present in court was accepted by the trial court as his testimony and relied on. Aggrieved by the decision of the court which was unfavourable to the defendants, they appealed to the Court of Appeal.
Held: (Allowing the appeal)
1. Attributes of fair hearing –
The following are the attributes of a fair hearing:
(a) The court shall hear both sides not only in the case but also on all material issues in the case before reaching a decision which may be prejudicial to any party in the case,
(b) The court or tribunal shall give equal treatment, opportunity and consideration to all concerned,
(c) That the proceedings shall be held in public and all concerned have access to and be informed of such a place of public hearing,
(d) Having regard to all the circumstance in every material decision in the case, justice must not only be done but must manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to have been done.
In the instant case, the trial court erred by not affording the defendants opportunity to cross-examine one of plaintiff’s witnesses, testimony of which it relied on to make a decision which was set aside on appeal. [Iwuoha v. Felix Okoroike (1996) 2 NWLR (Pt. 429) 231 referred to] [P. 184, Paras. E – G]
2. Mandatoriness of oral evidence being direct, Evidence Act, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, section 77 considered –
By the provisions of section 77 of the Evidence Act, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, oral evidence must be direct. In the instant case, trial court erred by accepting an affidavit as oral evidence of a witness, its decision was therefore set aside on appeal. [P. 183, Para. H]
3. Purport of cross-examination –
The aim of cross-examination is to enable the cross-examining party to demolish or weaken the case of the party being cross-examined and also to afford him the opportunity of stating or presenting its case through the witness of its opponent. All cross-examination must be relevant to the witness’s credit. In other words, the object of cross-examination is twofold, to weaken, qualify or destroy the case of the opponent and to establish the party’s own case by means of his opponent’s witnesses. [Pp. 184 – 185, Paras. H – A]
4. Cross-examination as an essential attribute of well contested suit, nature of facts elicited from and duty of trial court to consider –
Cross-examination is an essential attribute of a well contested suit. Facts elicited from cross-examination have evidential weight and value and also provide a compelling consideration by the trial court. In other words, the trial court is obligated to consider the product of cross-examination in the evaluation and adduction of value to the entire evidence placed before the court. It is under cross-examination that the witness is ruffled by words dressed in questions eliciting immediate answers. The truthfulness of the witness is tested and ascertained by his response to the piercing questions asked on the testimony just given. The veracity or otherwise of such sworn testimonies are affirmed from a restatement of the issue relayed smoothly at the evidence-in-chief. Hard facts do not change under the fire of cross-examination but falsehood cannot stand the heat. By this tool of scrutiny without an opportunity of a rehearsal, the trial court is assisted to decipher the core of the case placed before it. [P. 185, Paras. C – E]
5. Impossibility of valid judicial pronouncement flowing from flawed procedure –
No judicial pronouncement of value can flow from a flawed procedure. [P. 188, Para. C]
JUDGEMENT
DONGBAN-MENSEM JCA (Delivering the Lead Judgment): On 25 July 2003, the respondent as plaintiff at the trial court, filed a writ of summons dated the 24 July 2003. The writ which was duly endorsed with the statement of claim seeks the following reliefs:
i. A declaration that Patent No. RP 9970 is valid and has been infringed by the defendants and all those on whose behalf the defendants are sued.
ii. An injunction to restrain the defendants and each of those upon whose behalf the defendants are sued whether by themselves, their directors, officers, employees, servants or agents or otherwise howsoever from doing or authorizing the doing of the following acts or any of them, that is to say importing, selling, using or for the purpose of sale or use in Nigeria, stocking the product branded as “AMLOVAS” or any other product containing the product named Amlodipine Besylate or otherwise infringe Patent No. 9970.
iii. An order for delivery up for destruction on oath of all stock of AMLOVAS tablets or any other product or chemical compound in the defendants’ possession, custody or power which infringe Patent No. 9970.
iv. An enquiry as to damages.
v. Such further or other relief as this honourable court may seem meet.
vi. Costs.
The appellants as defendants at the trial court filed an amended statement of defence and a counterclaim on 28 April 2006. The counterclaim were in these terms:
(a) General damages against the plaintiff arising from the acts of the plaintiff’s agent/attorney which resulted in the sealing up of the 1st defendant’s premises and or depriving the 1st defendant income from his trade in AMLOVAS.
(b) A declaration that the detention of the Chief Executive/Managing Director of the 1st defendant at the cells of the F.C.I.D. Alagbon Close, for several days by or at the instance of the plaintiff, their agents, servants, attorneys and or privies amounts to a serious violation of the 1st defendant’s right to personal liberty and dignity of the person guaranteed under sections 33, 34 and 35 of the 1999 Constitution and Articles 4, 5 and 6 of the African Charter on Human & Peoples Right (Ratification and Enforcement) Act Cap. 10, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990.
(c) Exemplary and aggravated damages for unlawful violation of the 1st defendant’s fundamental rights as assessed by the court.
Issue one
Whether the decision of the trial court denying appellants their right to cross-examine respondent’s witness (called PW4), who did not appear in court, and permitting the said witness to file an affidavit evidence without more, is not a breach of appellants’ right to fair hearing.
The specific objections of the appellants to the order of the court as argued in the appellants’ brief of argument however are:
That section 78 of the Evidence Act requires the court to specify facts to be proved by affidavit, and does not empower the court to order all facts in issue to be proved by affidavit.
That the provisions of Order 41, rules 2 and 3 of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2000 and section 78 of the Evidence Act are applicable only to facts which are not in dispute and not to the present case.
That excusing the witness from cross-examination amounts to a denial of the appellants’ right to fair hearing.
That permitting the appellants to serve interrogatories on the witness is not an appropriate substitute for cross-examination as interrogatories only allow the appellants to put questions to the witness as if he were the appellants’ witness.
In response to the argument of the appellants, the respondent submits that the purport and spirit of the provision of section 78 of the Evidence Act requiring the specification of the facts sought to be proved by affidavit is to ensure that such facts are disclosed as a condition precedent to the grant of an order of court authorising affidavit evidence during trial. Specification of the facts sought to be proved enables the court assess the suitability of affidavit to prove same.
Where the affidavit or the sworn deposition sought to be filed in lieu of the witness’s viva voce evidence is exhibited to the affidavit in support of the application seeking the order of court, the requirements of identifying the facts to be proved by affidavit has been satisfied, as all the facts sought to be proved are deposed to in the deposition.
It is further the contention of the respondent that if section 78 of the Evidence Act has not been complied with, the order made by the court is nonetheless given statutory cover by the provisions of the Order 41, rules 2 and 3 of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2000.
While section 78 of the Evidence Act empowers the court to order that “specified facts” be proved by affidavit, Order 41, rule 2 empowers the court to order that “all or any evidence” be given by affidavit.
In response to the appellants’ argument that the provisions of Order 41, rules 2 and 3 of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2000 and section 78 of the Evidence Act are applicable only to facts which are not in dispute, respondent maintains that neither in Order 41, rules 2 and 3 nor in section 78 of the Evidence Act is it provided that it is only facts which are not in dispute that can be proved by the affidavit evidence authorised by those provisions that the passage quoted in the appellants’ brief of argument, from page 669 of the book, Civil Procedure in Nigeria by Fidelis Nwadialo merely states a general rule. However, to every general rule, there are exceptions. In the present case, Order 41, rules 2 and 3 of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2000 and section 78 Evidence Act constitute exceptions to the general rule. The language of these statutory provisions unambiguously empower the court to order affidavit evidence without any qualification.
In response to the appellants’ contention that excusing the witness from cross-examination amounts to a denial of the appellants’ right to fair hearing, the respondent submits that appellants had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness before a notary public, when the witness was in Nigeria, but declined the opportunity. It is suggested that the refusal of the appellants’ counsel to cross-examine the witness before the notary public was not due to shortness of time to prepare for cross-examination as he claimed, but it was a deliberate attempt to deprive the respondent of the services of the witness, the appellants’ counsel having been informed beforehand, that the witness would not make more than one trip to Nigeria for the case. Whereas, it is well settled that where a litigant fails to make use of the opportunity given to him to present his case, he cannot turn around to complain of having been denied of his right to fair hearing: Darma v. Oceanic Bank International (Nig.) Ltd (2005) All FWLR (Pt. 248) 1622, (2005) 4 NWLR (Pt. 915) 391 at 409; Eke v. Ogbonda (2006) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1012) 506 at 533, (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 351) 1456. Further, opportunity was given to the appellants, after the witness’s affidavit was ordered to be received as his testimony, to submit questions to the witness which the witness was obliged, by the order of the court, to answer under oath. The appellants, however, chose not to take advantage of this opportunity. It is submitted that the evidence given by the witness, being scientific in nature,the demeanour of the witness was not a critical factor in the court’s evaluation of the testimony. Therefore, the submission of written questions to the witness was a reasonable and fair means of enabling the appellants obtain information from the witness which the respondent’s questions did not elicit.
Given all the foregoing, it is submitted that the appellants have no cause to complain that they were denied any right of fair hearing.
In response to the argument of the appellants, that the order of court permitting the appellants to serve interrogatories on the witness is not an appropriate substitute for cross-examination as interrogatories only allow the appellants to put questions to the witness as if he were the appellants’ witness. It is submitted as follows:
Firstly, and most importantly, the order prayed for by the respondent and which was granted by the lower court was that “the defendants be at liberty to serve on the plaintiff written questions or interrogatories which shall be answered by Professor Barany by way of an affidavit” (emphasis supplied). Therefore, the order of the court did not limit the appellants to serving on the respondent, only “interrogatories”. The order of court provided the appellants with the alternative of serving on the respondent any “written question” and did not limit the type of written questions that may be asked.
Secondly, the word. “interrogatories” is interpreted in Collins English Dictionary to mean: “written questions asked by party to a suit, to which the other party has to give written answers under oath”. The restriction as to the type of questions which may be asked by interrogatories referred to in the submission of the appellants, apply to interrogatories ordered as part of the pretrial process of discovery. That is not the situation in this case. The interrogatories ordered here is not the pretrial interrogatories. Hence, the judicial and text book authorities cited, which relate only to pretrial interrogatories, do not apply. Having argued in the foregoing paragraphs that the decision whether or not to receive the testimony of Prof. Barany by way of an affidavit and to excuse him from attending court for the purpose of cross-examination was an exercise of the discretionary power of the court, it is relevant to point out that an appellate court has been enjoined not to interfere with the exercise of the discretion of the trial court merely on the ground that it would have exercised its own discretion differently. In Saraki v. Kotoye (1990) 4 NWLR (Pt. 143) 144 at 188, it was held that the appellate court may interfere with the exercise of the discretion of the trial court only under specific circumstances: Firstly, if the discretionary decision of the trial court was based upon a misunderstanding of the law. Secondly, if further evidence before the appellate court shows that some inference that particular facts exist or did not exist were erroneously made by the trial court on evidence then available to it. Thirdly, if there has been a change of circumstances since the trial court exercised its discretion. The appellants have not contended that any of the conditions which would justify an appellate court interfering with the exercise of the discretion of the trial court exists in this case.
Before concluding, a correction needs to be made of a misstatement of fact made by the appellants in paragraph 3,1.10 of the appellants’ brief of argument. It was stated that the affidavit of the respondent’s witness was deposed to and filed before the order of the court allowing it to be received as the witness’s testimony. It is not true that the deposition of Professor Barany was filed before the order of the court. It was exhibited to the affidavit in support of the motion seeking leave to use it as the deponent’s testimony. It was not filed on its own until after the order of the court was made.
This court is urged to answer issue 1 in the affirmative, in the alternative, the respondent submit that if the lower court was in error in accepting the affidavit of Prof. George Barany as his testimony whilst excusing him from attending court for the purpose of cross-examination, the error should not result in a miscarriage of justice: Ejiogu v. Irona (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 442) 1066, (2009) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1132) 513 at 578; Atoyebi v. Governor of Oyo State (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt. 344) 290 at 311.
The appellants have not contended that the verdict of the lower court cannot be sustained without the testimony of Professor Barany. Furthermore, the respondent submits that arguments under issue 2 below will show that the argument in support of the validity of patent No. RP 9970 can be upheld without the testimony of Prof. Barany will make the case stronger.
These are high sounding fanciful legalese of the imagination of the learned counsel for the respondent. Where do all these leave the provisions of section 36 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria of 1999?
Section 77 of the Evidence Act, LFN 2004, which regulates that oral evidence must be direct?
Prof. Barany’s affidavit testimony which was extensively reproduced in the judgement of the trial court, found corroboration in the testimony of Prof. Coker which provided the detailed requisite for establishing the case of the respondent as plaintiff. The learned trial Judge believed the said affidavit evidence hook, line and sinker!
What, further evidence of miscarriage of justice is required?
The learned trial Judge referred extensively to Prof. Barany’s evidence which the Judge preferred over the evidence of Prof. Ifudu whose evidence the learned trial Judge found was discredited under cross-examination.
The evidence of Prof. Barany was not subjected to a similar testing under cross-examination; it might have not passed the test also. The appellant have raised the issue of fair hearing as they were denied an opportunity to similarly scrutinize the evidence of Prof. Barany under cross-examination. Would this not amount to double standard and a denial of fair hearing? Could the parties be said to have operated from level platform before the learned trial Judge? Without going into the technicality of the interpretation of the provision of section 78 and 41 of the Evidence Act, ex-facie, the parties were not given equal opportunity. It would have been different if the learned trial Judge did not rely on the testimony of Prof. Barany. Cross-examination is an essential part of every proceeding. It is a determining factor in the value of the evidence place before the trial court.
The attributes of a fair hearing were set out in the case of Lambert Iwuoha v. Felix Okoroike (1996) 2 NWLR (Pt. 429) 231 at 250 consisting of
(a) The court shall hear both sides not only in the case but also on all material issues in the case before reaching a decision which may be prejudicial to any party in the case;
(b) The court or tribunal shall give equal treatment, opportunity and consideration to all concerned;
(c) That the proceedings shall be held in public and all concerned have access to and be informed of such a place of public hearing; and
(d) That having regard to all the circumstance in every material decision in the case, justice must not only be done but must manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to have been done.
This court per Edozie JCA also held (supra) that:
“The aim of cross-examination is to enable the cross-examining party to demolish or weaken the case of the party being cross-examined and also to afford the cross-examining party the opportunity of stating or presenting its case through the witness of its opponent. As stated by the learned authors of Phipson on Evidence 12th Edition paragraph 1592.”
“All cross-examination must be relevant to the witness’s credit. The object of cross-examination is twofold: to weaken, qualify or destroy the case of the opponent; and to establish the party’s own case by means of this opponent’s witnesses”.
“It seems to me therefore that the course taken by the learned trial Judge in restricting the appellant’s counsel’s cross-examination only on question of damages without allowing him establish through the respondent the defences of justification and privilege is an act which seriously undermined the appellant’s right to fair hearing”.
In my humble view, cross-examination is an essential attribute of a well contested suit. Facts elicited from cross-examination have evidential weight and value and also provide a compelling consideration by the learned trial Judge. In other words, the learned trial Judge is obligated to consider the product of cross-examination in the evaluation and adduction of value to the entire evidence placed before the court. Indeed, it is under cross-examination that the witness is ruffled by words dressed in questions eliciting immediate answers. The truthfulness of the witness is tested and ascertained by his response to the piercing questions asked on the testimony just given. The veracity or otherwise of such sworn testimonies are affirmed from a restatement of the issue relayed smoothly at the evidence-in-chief. Hard facts do not change under the fire of cross-examination but falsehood cannot stand the heat. By this tool of scrutiny without an opportunity of a rehearsal, the learned trial Judge is assisted to decipher the core of the case placed before it.
In this appeal, the learned trial Judge reaped the fruits of cross-examination when his lordship rejected the testimony of Prof. Ifudu whose testimony was discredited under cross-examination. What is good for the goose is good for the gander. Apparently oblivious of the consequence of having denied the appellant the right of cross-examination; Prof. Barany, the learned trial Judge relied heavily on the affidavit evidence of which had not been tested by the furnace of cross-examination.
An extensive reproduction of the findings of the learned trial Judge explains the point:
“The two expert witnesses of the plaintiff in their evidence, they both stated that the invention patented in exhibits A, B, C and D are new and not anticipated. Professor Coker (PW1) said that what was discovered and registered in the above stated exhibits is the “unexpected excellent solubility, stability of the besylate salt of amlodipine.” That before that discovery, there was no basis or knowledge that will anticipate besylate as an additional acid salt for amlodipine, because there is nothing in the properties of the besylate salt like stability, solubility, hygroscopicity that could encourage any pharmacist to consider besylate salt as an additional acid salt of amlodipine.
Professor Coker stated that though amlodipine base was discovered by the plaintiff as a cure for heart related diseases, but the base cannot be taken alone, it has to be converted to salt for easy absorption.
Professor Barany further gave detained testimony on the patents exhibits A, B, C, and D which he said he had studied, and compared, and concluded that all relate to the same invention. I have quoted the evidence of Professor Barany earlier in the evaluation of evidence in this judgement. His evidence is to the effect that before 1986, the inventions registered and claimed in these exhibits are not obvious to anyone skilled in the art. Though, the therapeutic property of the active compound amlodipine as ester and as maleate salts were previously known, but the advantageous combination of physical and chemical properties of besylate individually or in combination could not have been predicted prior to the invention protected in exhibits A, B, C, and D. These physical and chemical properties are what Professor Coker (PW1) had earlier described as “unexpected excellent solubility and stability of the besylate salt of amlodipine”. The previous knowledge of mesoridizine and atracrium do not, according to Professor Barany lead to amlodipine besylate because they are structurally very different, and there could not be motivation for any one skilled in the art to make amlodipine besylate.
Professor Ifudu’s testimony as DW1, is to the effect that the prior knowledge of the existence of cisatracurium and atracurium besylate could leave any scientifically minded person (person skilled in the art) to know that here is a besylate salt which can have activity and therefore deserves attention. But it is pertinent to note that Professor Ifude did agree when asked during cross-examination that as a general rule, different salts forming drugs differ and since changing the salt can dramatically change the property in the drug, every salt form should be considered as a medice produc and tested appropriately before use in clinical practice. Professor Ifudu, in what appeared to be contradictory to this earlier evidence (that if as a scientist or pharmacist, knew as ab initio the properties of a base, before its conversion to salt form) then he can predict the chemical properties of that salt), agree with Mr. Ogunkeye during cross-examination, that there is no reliable way of predicting the influence of a particular salt specie on the behavior of a patent compound.
I find the evidence of Professor Ifudu speculative and evasive and in fact an attempt to confuse issues under determination. I prefer the evidence of both Professor Coker and Professor Barrany, especially as there is no better evidence presented before me of any probative value that contradicts material by their evidence; so to the effect that there was no previous knowledge made public of the superior physical and chemical properties that have direct positive inpact on the drug amlodipine. Moreover, it is not disputed that amlodipine had earlier been discovered and patented in favour of the plaintiff, but that discovery is useless without the later discovery of the impact of the besylate salt of almodipine. Note that in the law of patents, it is the practical application of a discovery which leads to patentability, even if that practical application is inherent in the discovery or is obvious, once the discovery has been made. In this case, from the evidence presented by both parties, the practical application of besylate salt of amlodipine was not obvious before the discovery by the plaintiff. I therefore agree with submissions of Mr. Ogunkeye, counsel to the plaintiff that there was nothing, based on the evidence of both plaintiff and defendants, to show that amolodipine besylate forms part of the art prior to the application for the patents.
Another challenge raised by the defendants to the validity of the patents in exhibits A, B, C and D above is what actually was the subject or products of these patents. The defence contend that what was patented in exhibit “A” is a process not a product. Mr. Duru said once the claims in exhibit “A” are read together with the granting portion, it becomes clear that exhibit “A” refers to the pharmaceutical processes and not the product. Counsel submitted that no extrinsic evidence is given by the plaintiff to prove the product’s validity. On the contrary, the plaintiff’s witnesses, Professors Coker (PW1) and Barany (PW4) have given quite extrinsic evidence as to the patents registered in exhibit “A”, and I have stated in details their evidence (supra)”
Clearly, the learned trial Judge was profoundly swerved by the testimony of Prof. Barany in arriving at the decision his lordship did. The fact that a similar testimony was rejected as a result of cross-examination raises a serious question as to the judicial fairness of the proceedings to the appellants.
The learned counsel to the respondent submits that the appellants which have suffered no miscarriage of justice has not asked that the suit of the respondent be “jettisoned”. This is not correct, it is the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants that the denial to cross-examine led to a substantial miscarriage of justice sufficient to vitiate the entire proceedings before the learned trial Judge.
I agree.
The other issues formulated have their limbs tied to the umbilical cord of the 1st issue. No judicial pronouncement of value can flow from a flawed procedure, especially one affecting fundamental rights. It would be a wasted effort to proceed any further.
This appeal is allowed. The decision of the learned trial Judge is hereby set aside.
A cost of N30,000.00 (thirty thousand naira) is awarded to the appellant and against the respondent.
GALINJE JCA: I have had the privilege of reading before now the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Dongban-Mensem JCA and I entirely agree with the reasoning contained therein and the conclusion arrived thereat.
For the same reasons in the judgment which I adopt as mine, I allow this appeal and set aside the decision of the learned trial Judge.
I subscribe to the order of cost made therein.
SAULAWA JCA: I agree, in toto, with the reasoning and conclusion reached in the lead judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Dongban-Mensem JCA, to the effect that the appeal is meritorious.
Hence, the appeal is hereby allowed by me. The decision of the lower court is set aside. I abide by the consequential order of cost of N30,000.00 (thirty thousand naira) awarded to the appellant, against the respondent.
Appeal allowed
Subsequent Appeal to the Supreme Court
The decision of the Court of Appeal was subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court in Tyonex Nigeria Limited & Anor. v. Pfizer Limited, Suit No. SC.360/2010, decided on 3 May 2019.
The Appellants challenged the Court of Appeal’s decision not to determine the remaining issues raised in their appeal after finding that they had been denied a fair hearing. Pfizer Limited also cross-appealed against the Court of Appeal’s decision.
The Supreme Court considered, among other issues, the failure of the Court of Appeal to determine the remaining issues and the treatment of the Appellants’ counterclaim. The Supreme Court ultimately ordered that the case be remitted to the Federal High Court for retrial.
Nigerian Cases Referred to in the Judgment:
Atoyebi v. Governor of Oyo State (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt. 344) 290
Darma v. Oceanic Bank International (Nig.) Ltd (2005) All FWLR (Pt. 248) 1622, (2005) 4 NWLR (Pt. 915) 391
Eke v. Ogbonda (2006) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1012) 506, (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 351) 1456
Ejiogu v. Irona (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 442) 1066, (2009) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1132) 513
Iwuoha v. Felix Okoroike (1996) 2 NWLR (Pt. 429) 231
Saraki v. Kotoye (1990) 4 NWLR (Pt. 143) 144
Nigerian Statutes Referred to in the Judgment:
African Charter on Human & Peoples Right (Ratification and Enforcement) Act, Cap. 10, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990, articles 4, 5 and 6
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, sections 33, 34, 35 and 36
Evidence Act, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, sections 41, 77 and 78
Nigerian Rules of Court Referred to in the Judgment:
Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2000, Order 41, rules 2 and 3
Books Referred to in the Judgment:
Civil Procedure in Nigeria by Fidelis Nwadialor, page 669
Collins English Dictionary
Phipson on Evidence 12th edition paragraph 1592